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The lending channel under optimal choice of monetary 
policy 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 33/2007 
Juha Kilponen – Alistair Milne 




Building on Cecchetti and Li (2005), we show that the bank lending channel 
affects monetary policy trade-offs only when interest rates affect marginal costs of 
production (ie when there is a cost channel of monetary policy) in the New 
Keynesian monetary policy model. In our calibrated model the resulting impact of 
the bank lending channel on output-inflation trade-offs is quantitatively small and 
of ambiguous sign. When bank capital varies counter cyclically and bank loan 
rates have a relatively large impact on marginal costs, variation of bank loan 
margins improves monetary policy trade-offs. The new Basel accord, by 
increasing capital requirements during economic downturns, offsets this beneficial 
impact. 
 
Keywords: bank capital, bank lending, capital buffers, pro-cyclicality, capital 
regulation, cost channel, credit channel, loan margins, monetary trade-offs 
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Pankkien luottokanava ja optimaalinen rahapolitiikka 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 33/2007 
Juha Kilponen – Alistair Milne 




Tässä keskustelualoitteessa arvioidaan pankkien luottokanavan vaikutusta opti-
maaliseen rahapolitiikkaan uuskeynesiläisessä rahapolitiikkamallissa. Tavan-
omaista uuskeynesiläistä rahapolitiikkamallia on laajennettu lisäämällä siihen 
pankkien luottokanavan lisäksi rahapolitiikan kustannuskanava. Mallissa pankit 
ylläpitävät minimipääomavaatimusta suurempia pääomapuskureita. Pääoma-
puskurien suuruus vaikuttaa pankkien luotonantoon ja lainakorkoihin, mikä puo-
lestaan välittyy tuotantoon ja inflaatioon rahapolitiikan kustannuskanavan sekä 
perinteisen korkojen kysyntävaikutuksen kautta. Rahapolitiikan kustannuskanava 
eli se, että korkojen vaihtelu välittyy suoraan tuotannon rajakustannuksiin, muut-
taa yhdessä luotonantokanavan kanssa rahapolitiikan välittymistä inflaatioon ja 
tuotantoon. Kalibroidussa mallissa luottokanavan vaikutus optimaaliseen raha-
politiikkaan on kuitenkin varsin pieni ja merkiltään epäselvä. Kuitenkin, jos pank-
kien ylläpitämät pääomapuskurit vaihtelevat vastasyklisesti ja pankkien laina-
koroilla on suhteellisen suuri vaikutus tuotannon rajakustannuksiin, on luotto-
kanavan vaikutus optimaalisen rahapolitiikan kannalta myönteinen. Jos pääoma-
puskurit vaihtelevat myötäsyklisesti, kuten on mahdollista uuden Basel-sopimuk-
sen myötä, luottokanava lisää inflaation ja tuotannon vaihteluita, jolloin talouden 
stabilointi edellyttää suurempia koron muutoksia. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkien pääoma, luotonanto, pääomapuskurit, myötäsyklisyys, 
vakavaraisuussääntely, kustannuskanava, luottokanava, luottomarginaalit 
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A large literature considers the lending channel of monetary transmission.
Some analyses suggest that bank balance sheets eﬀects, for example the
interaction of bank liquidity or net worth with loan interest rate elasticities,
magnify the impact of monetary policy.1 A related concern is that banking
sector weakness may contribute to economic downturns. Such bank crises have
been typically been followed — both in emerging and developed economies —
by major falls in bank lending and output, suggesting that a deterioration of
banking sector net worth can result in substantial output losses.2 The main
trigger of the ﬁnancial markets turmoil in the second half of 2007 has been the
concern that the write down of holdings of sub-prime mortgage securities and
the necessity of re-ﬁnancing other oﬀ-balance sheet exposures will erode bank
capital and lead to a substantial contraction of bank credit. Bank defaults also
help explain the length and severity of the great depression in the US.3
Bank capital regulations are also suspected of having undesirable
macroeconomic impacts. A tightening of bank capital standards has been
often cited as a contributing cause to the US recession of 1990—1991.4 More
recently many commentators have been concerned that the new Basel II accord
on bank capital regulation (as agreed by the Basel Committee, 2004) will
exacerbate business cycle ﬂuctuations.5 Under the advanced IRB calculations
of the new accord, regulatory capital requirements are increased in cyclical
downturns and it is feared that these increases may constrain bank lending
and exaggerate cyclical ﬂuctuations of output.
The present paper explores these issues using a macroeconomic model in
which monetary policy makers seek to minimise an objective function quadratic
in the deviations of both inﬂation and output around speciﬁed targets. A
setting of this kind is necessary in order to provide a full discussion of the
macroeconomic impact of the bank lending channel, allowing for any oﬀsetting
responses in monetary policy. We examine the resulting behaviour of output
and inﬂation under diﬀerent assumptions about the operation of the bank
lending channel and the regulation of bank capital and also use the quadratic
objective function to compare intertemporal losses in these diﬀerent cases.
Our setup has two distinctive features. The ﬁr s ti st h a tw ea l l o wb a n k st o
hold buﬀers of capital over and above minimum regulatory capital requirements
and for the magnitude of this capital buﬀer to aﬀect the supply of bank
1For example the interaction of liquidity and the response of bank lending to monetary
policy, reported by Kashyap and Stein (2000). Our analysis is based a slightly diﬀerent
interpretation of the role of bank balance sheets in monetary transmission.
2Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002) ﬁnd that output losses during crisis periods in
developed countries are as much as 10—15% of annual GDP higher on average than in
neighbouring countries that did not at the time experience severe banking problems.
3As argued by Bernanke (1983). Calomiris and Mason (2003) conﬁrm the importance
of US banking failures in the propogation of the great depression using using disaggretated
data.
4The Sharpe (1995) review of the evidence provided from the many research studies on
the US credit crunch of 1990—1991, suggests this was not in fact a major contributing factor
outside of New England.
5The evidence on procyclicality of the Pillar 1 capital requirements of Basel II is reviewed
by Kashyap and Stein (2004) and by Gordy and Howells (2006).
7lending. Most previous analysis of the macroeconomic impact of bank capital
makes the mechanical and counterfactual assumption that regulatory capital
requirements directly constrain the volume of bank lending (ie that bank
lending is some multiple of regulatory capital).6 In practice, as several recent
studies have pointed out, banks almost always operate with buﬀers of capital
well in excess of minimum regulatory requirements.7 In our model a shortfall
of this capital buﬀer — relative to a desired or target level — reduces bank loan
supply and increases bank loan margins.
T h es e c o n dd i s t i n c t i v ef e a t u r ei st h a tw ea l l o wf o rt h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fa‘ c o s t
channel’ of monetary policy, with either or both market and bank interest
rates directly aﬀecting marginal costs of production. In the presence of a cost
channel a tightening of monetary policy has the eﬀect not just of reducing
output and hence lowering future inﬂation; it also leads to a rise in current
inﬂation. The cost-channel thus constrains the ability of policy makers to
respond to shocks. As we will show the presence of a cost-channel is an
important determinant of the macroeconomic impact of bank capital. Without
a cost channel, monetary policy can be re-adjusted to oﬀs e tt h ei m p a c to f
changes of bank capital or bank capital regulation on output and inﬂation.
Our model is in other respects a standard ‘New Keynesian’ monetary
policy model. The dynamics of the output gap and of inﬂation both depend
upon expectations of future output and inﬂa t i o na sw e l la sl a g g e do u t p u t
and inﬂation. Monetary policy is chosen so as to achieve the minimisation
of a quadratic loss function in output and inﬂation variability. While this
is a standard set up there are some inherent limitations. In order to obtain
tractable solutions for optimal policy, this type of model considers only the
linearised dynamics for small deviations of state variables — in our case output,
inﬂation, and bank buﬀer capital — around their long term equilibrium values.
The theory of precautionary bank capital suggests that there should be instead
a non-linear relationship between bank net worth and bank lending, with
relatively small macroeconomic impacts of bank net worth when bank capital
is close to desired levels and much larger impacts when there is a substantial
shortfall of bank capital. Our simulation results must therefore be interpreted
with some care. We believe they capture the operation of monetary policy
during normal business cycle ﬂuctuations but not during an extreme systemic
event.
The analysis is developed as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of
the relationship between bank balance sheets and the macro-economy, bringing
together some of the diﬀerent perspectives found in the macroeconomics and
ﬁnance literatures, and motivating our speciﬁcation of the lending and cost
channels. Section 3 presents our macroeconomic model and discusses its
parameterisation. Sections 4 presents our results, using impulse response
functions to explore the behaviour of interest rates, output, and inﬂation under
diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and comparing intertemporal losses arising from
t h ev a r i a n c eo fo u t p u ta n di n ﬂation. Sections 5 concludes with a summary of
6For example Blum and Hellwig (1995) or Cecchetti and Li (2005).
7See for example Puera and Keppo (2006) and Jokipii and Milne (2006) and other
references cited in Section 2 of this paper.
8results and a discussion of how the conclusions might alter outside the assumed
linear-quadratic modelling framework.
2 Bank loan supply and the cost channel
Most quantitative macro-monetary modelling ignores ﬁnancial intermediaries,
focusing on the relationship between market interest rates and macroeconomic
aggregates. Typically households and corporations are assumed to be able
to borrow or lend freely at prevailing market rates of interest. While the
‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ has been introduced into structural ‘New-Keynesian’
macromodels (beginning with Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999) and
shown to both amplify and propagate business cycle ﬂuctuations, banks
and other ﬁnancial intermediaries have mostly continued to be regarded as
passive conduits of monetary policy. To our knowledge the only previous
quantitative macro-monetary model with optimal monetary policy and an
explicit role for bank balance sheets is Cecchetti and Li (2005). They point
out that it is essential to model monetary policy, as well as bank capital and
lending decisions, in order to properly understand the macroeconomic impact
of bank capital regulation on business cycle ﬂuctuations. They argue that
capital requirements need not worsen monetary policy trade-oﬀs, showing,
in a standard reduced form monetary policy model where policy makers are
concerned to reduce both ﬂuctuations of output and of inﬂation, that it
is possible for policy makers to entirely oﬀset the impacts of bank capital
requirements on aggregate demand, adjusting the monetary policy rule so
as to re-establish the policy maker’s preferred trade-oﬀ between output and
inﬂation. As we will show the same argument applies more broadly. It may
also be possible for policy makers to adjust interest rates so as to entirely
oﬀset the impact of bank balance sheets and bank interest rates on output
and inﬂation and hence that the bank lending channel may have no impact on
output-inﬂation tradeoﬀs.
The present paper builds on Cecchetti and Li (2005), with the crucial
diﬀerence that we take account not just of the lending channel but also
of the cost-channel impact of monetary policy. This means that it is no
longer possible for policy makers to entirely oﬀset the impact of the bank
lending channel on output and inﬂation. We also improve on their analysis by
introducing a more realistic treatment of bank capital management and bank
loan supply, modelling the impact of bank capital on bank loan supply through
departures of the capital buﬀer from its target level. The remainder of this
section grounds our treatment of bank loan supply and the cost channel in the
broader literature.
Several theoretical analyses stresses the role of banks in overcoming
information asymmetries, for example through the monitoring of bank
borrowers that may otherwise declare default and avoid repayment of loans.
As discussed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), such monitoring implies two
additional channels of macroeconomic propagation, not captured in standard
models of the macroeconomy. First (as previously analysed by for example
9B e r n a n k ea n dG e r t l e r ,1 9 8 9 )t h e r ei sw h a ti su s u a l l yr e f e r r e dt oa st h e
‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ or ‘balance sheet’ channel of business cycle propagation.
The ability of ﬁrms to raise monitored external ﬁnance depends upon their
net worth and hence a decline in the net worth of bank dependent ﬁrms
is likely to reduce both bank lending and corporate investment and other
expenditures. The role of banks as suppliers of monitored ﬁnance introduces
a further, complementary, channel of monetary transmission. As discussed in
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) banks themselves must have suﬃcient capital
in order themselves to have an incentive to undertake such monitoring. This
in turn suggests that ﬂuctuations in the level of bank capital can generates
a shifts in bank loan supply that further amplify and propagate the business
cycle.
Analysis of this second channel of macroeconomic propagation should take
account of the fact that bank capitalisation is an endogenous choice variable.
How is this to be done? One possible approach is to follow the example of
Diamond and Rajan (2000) extending standard models of bank monitoring
by introducing a trade-oﬀ between capital issue (protection against shocks)
and deposit ﬁnance (protection against opportunistic behaviour by the bank
exploiting uninformed shareholders), thus determining optimal bank capital
decision. The diﬃculty with this approach for modelling monetary policy is
that it is technically diﬃcult to model capital dynamics in such a setting. In a
recent paper, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) have taken a step to this
direction. They introduce ﬁnancial intermediaries (banks) into DSGE model
with monetary policy. In their model, the banks make loans to ﬁrms by which
they ﬁnance working capital. The banks also hold excess reserves as an input
to the production of demand deposit services. These reserves, and thus the
bank’s balance sheet, also play a role in bank interest rate determination.
Our analysis draws instead on recent more stylised ‘inventory’ models of
bank capital, exploring the dynamics of bank capital around such their optimal
level, without explicitly addressing the various capital market frictions that
lead banks to hold capital.8 These models recognise that as a result of capital
market frictions it can be costly for banks to recapitalise. Market or credit
losses, or rapid balance sheet expansion, can temporarily reduce bank capital
below desired levels and thus lead to restrictions in the supply of bank loans.
A number of empirical studies suggest that deterioration of bank earnings or
bank net worth restrain lending in the manner consistent with these models.9
We also allow for the presence of a ‘cost channel’ ie that possibility that
bank and market interest rates directly aﬀect marginal costs of production,
as well as altering inter-temporal trade-oﬀs in consumption and investment.
This means that the immediate impact of higher interest rates, just like any
other cost shock, is to increase prices and inﬂation and only subsequently,
through the impact of output on inﬂation, does a monetary tightening lead to
8There is now a fairly large literature of such models including Passmore and Sharpe
(1994), Baglioni and Cherubini (1994), Calem and Rob (1996), Froot and Stein (1998),
Milne and Whalley (1999), Milne (2002), Heuvel (2002), Milne and Whalley (2003), Milne
(2004), Heuvel (2004), Estrella (2004), Puera and Keppo (2006) and Zhu (2006).
9For example Houston, Marcus and James (1997), Peek and Rosengreen (2000), Milne,
Robertson and Tang (2006).
10ar e d u c t i o no fi n ﬂation. The cost channel is central to our analysis because, as
we have already discussed, otherwise optimal choice of monetary policy fully
oﬀsets the bank lending channel in a standard New Keynesian model.
This cost mechanism appears to have been ﬁrst formally modelled in
‘limited participation’ models of monetary policy, for example in Fuerst (1992)
who assumes that producers borrow (from banks) in order to ﬁnance their
current wage bill, before receiving revenues from sales with the consequence
that reductions of real interest rates associated with a monetary expansion
leads to an increase in output and economic activity.10 The mechanism has
been elaborated in several recent dynamic general equilibrium models of the
‘cost channel’.11 We adopt a reduced form speciﬁcation that borrows on the
main insight of this literature, that interest rates impact directly on marginal
costs and hence on inﬂation. However, while this mechanism is now widely
recognised, its quantitative magnitude and the relative importance in the cost
channel of bank loan rates compared to market rates are not well established.
We will show that the impact of the bank lending channel is very sensitive to
assumptions about these parameters.
3 The model
This section presents our reduced form model of monetary policy with three
state variables, y (the log deviation of output from its steady state level
¯ y), inﬂation π (the deviation of inﬂation from its target level ¯ π)a n db (the
deviation of the buﬀer of bank capital from its long run target proportion
of bank assets ¯ b). It also discusses the determination of model parameters.
The model is solved using standard linear-quadratic techniques (described in
Appendix).
10Fuerst (1992) makes this assumption so as to obtain real eﬀects of monetary policy in
a model in which prices are ﬂexible but cash holdings are predetermined, preventing bond
market interest rates aﬀecting the demand for money. As a result expansionary open market
operations (exchange of money for bonds) result in a decline in real bond interest rates. This
‘limited participation’ can also explain the liquidity eﬀect of monetary policy on bond prices
modelled also for example by Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984), and Lucas
(1990). Limited participation does not however on its own oﬀer an entirely plausible account
of monetary policy transmission. For a critique see Williamson (2005).
11Barth and Ramey (2001) revive the argument for such a cost-channel, presenting
evidence that prices in at least some US 2-digit industries respond positively following a
surprise tightening of monetary policy. The cost channel has since been introduced into a
number of structural macroeconomic models including those of Rabanal (2003), Lawrence
J Christiano and Evans (2005), Olover huelsewig and Wollmershaeuser (2006), Kaufmann
and Scharler (2006) and Ibrahim Chowdhury and Schabert (2006).
113.1 State equations and model solution
The evolution of output and interest rates are described by the following
reduced form macro-monetary model. This is a standard New Keynesian
speciﬁcation adapted to include a role for the banking sector and speciﬁcally
for the constraining eﬀects of bank capital buﬀers on bank lending.
The time period is quarterly. Output yt is the log-diﬀerence of quarterly
output from its steady state value. The capital buﬀer bt is the ratio of beginning
of period accounting bank net worth to bank assets (assets could be rescaled
by a Basel type risk weighting, but doing so would not alter our results, since
these risk-weightings do not alter markedly over short time periods). Interest
and inﬂation are all quarter on quarter but expressed at annualised rate (eg
it =0 .04 r e p r e s e n t st h er a t eo fi n t e r e s to nf u n d si n v e s t e di nt h em a r k e ta tt i m et
until t+1at a 4% annual rate of return or 1% quarter on quarter). All variables
are deviations from steady state values.12 Interest rates are determined at the
beginning of each period and credited at the beginning of the following period.
The monetary policy objective is a choice of a path for interest rate
{it+k}
∞


















subject to constraints 3.2—3.5 describing the evolution of the economy. δ is
policymaker’s subjective discount factor and λ is relative weight attached to
output gap target. The welfare theoretic foundations of this type of objective
functions are laid down in Woodford (2003). Our objective function in 3.1
is written in terms of weighted quadratic deviations of inﬂation and output
from their respective steady state values. Given the backward looking nature
of output and inﬂation equations discussed below, the welfare theoretically
consistent criteria would be to consider quasi-diﬀerenced inﬂation and output.
However, above criteria still characterises the essential features by which
diﬀerent policy options can be ranked. Finally, in solving the optimal path
for interest rate, we consider both discretionary and commitment solutions to
the minimisation of this objective function.
Macroeconomic behaviour is described by the following state equations for
output and inﬂation










πt = β0πt−1 + β1πt+1|t + β2it + β3rt + β4yt + εt (3.3)
12In steady state we suppose that banks have market power and earn positive net interest
income from the margin between loan rates and market rates. But we are concerned only
with the deviations from steady state, so in steady state our model variables r and i both
equal zero.
12πt+1|t and yt+1|t denote expectations of inﬂation and output for the period t+1,
given information available at time t. ηt and εt denote demand and cost-push
shocks that are assumed to be drawn from mean zero normal distribution with
variance ση and σε. it and rt are the rate of interest of bank lending and
the short term market rate respectively. The banking sector holds a buﬀer of
capital above the minimum capital required capital ratio, denoted by a third
state variable bt evolving according to the linearised state equation
bt = γ0bt−1 + γ2it−1 + γ3 (rt−1 − it−1)+γ4yt−1 (3.4)
Finally the mark up of the loan interest rate rt over market interest rates
responds to deviations in the bank capital buﬀer13
rt − it = −μbt (3.5)
This setup diﬀers from standard reduced form macro-monetary models in the
following respects:
• It distinguishes the short term market rate of interest (it) — the policy
variable — from the rate of interest on bank lending (rt). In the standard
setting real market interest rates aﬀect aggregate demand by altering
intertemporal trade-oﬀs in consumption and investment (α2 > 0). Our
setting allows for the possibility that these trade-oﬀsa r ea l s oa ﬀected by
real bank lending rates (α3 > 0).
• As well as these standard impact of interest rates on demand the model
includes the ‘cost-channel’ impact of interest rates on the marginal costs
of production, both through short term market borrowing (β2)a n d
through bank borrowing (β3).
• Bank loan rates are aﬀected by bt — the beginning of period ratio of bank
capital (measured on an accounting basis) to total banks assets.
• bt is itself aﬀected by previous period output yt (through its impact on
l o a nd e m a n da n dl o a nq u a l i t y )a n db yp r e v i o u sp e r i o di n t e r e s tr a t e s
(through their impact on bank net interest income). Over time banks
adjust their dividend payment policy to restore bt back towards to long
run target levels.
3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the usual quarterly observation period for
macroeconomic modelling. The baseline parameter values together with
alternative parameter values are shown in Table 3.1. The values for α0,
α1, β0, β1 and β4 are similar to those emerging from many estimated New
13We have also experimented with alternative speciﬁcations in which loan rates are
smoothed over time, rather than adjusting immediately to changes in yt and bt,a n di n
which output has an additoinal direct demand impact on bank loan rates.
13Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium models. We set β0 and β1 to be
consistent with the microfounded model of Calvo pricing and complete price
indexation. Details of the model’s derivation are provided for instance in
Woodford (2003) and in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001). Giannoni
and Woodford (2003) has estimated the closely related Phillips curve for the
US albeit without allowing for any cost channel ie with the assumption that
β2 = β3 =0. Also, again in line with the New Keynesian macromodels,
we set the elasticity of inﬂation with respect to output gap β4 equal to 0.05.
This is within the rather wide range of estimates reported in the literature, for
example roughly two times higher than the value estimated Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) but about one third that implied by the estimates reported in
Lawrence J Christiano and Evans (2005). Note that log deviations in marginal
costs are proportion to, but perhaps three times larger than, log deviations in
the output gap and so that the elasticity on marginal costs is around three
times smaller than that on the output gap.14
Table 3.1 Parameter values
In our model, the speciﬁcation of aggregate demand equation is close to the
standard speciﬁcation derived from microfounded model of habit persistence
in consumption. The diﬀerence is that there are now two interest rates —
b a n kl o a nr a t e sa sw e l la st h emarket interest rate — that aﬀect aggregate
demand. To ensure parameterisation consistent with such a model, we impose
14See Ravenna and Walsh (2006) eqn (15) page 205. The relationship between log
deviations of output and marginal cost is the sum of the intertemporal elasticity of
consumption and of leisure, which under standard parameterisations is about three.
14the assumption that the sum of the two impacts (market interest rates and
bank loan rates) on aggregate demand is in line with these models of habit
persistence, ie that α2 + α3 =0 .515. For simulations with no bank lending
channel α2 =0 .5 and α3 =0 . Whenever we introduce a bank lending channel
we assume that α2 =0 .3 and α3 =0 .2.
We have reviewed the wide range of magnitudes in recent papers on the cost
channel.16 We have chosen a parameterisation towards the upper end of those
in this literature assuming, throughout our simulations, that the total impact
of interest rates on marginal cost (the cost channel) is parameterised with
β2 + β3 =0 .0333 ie an impact around twice our assumed impact of marginal
costs on inﬂation.17 We compare two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the impact of
loan rates on the cost channel. The ﬁrst is a ‘balanced’ speciﬁcation with β2 =
0.0167 and β3 =0 .01067 ie loan rates and market rates play an approximately
equal impact on both the cost channel. The second is an ‘unbalanced’ baseline
in which β2 =0and β3 =0 .0333. ie we assume that the cost channel operates
entirely through bank loan rates.
The behaviour of the bank capital buﬀer bt over time depends upon the
accumulation of net worth from after tax income, the growth of bank assets,
and on the adjustment the capital buﬀer back towards its long run desired level
through its decisions over the growth of loans and other assets and through the
payment of earnings to shareholders ie the dividend payout ratio. We assume
that each quarter this adjustment corrects the bank capital buﬀer back 30%
towards its long run level, ie the inertia in the bank capital buﬀer is set equal
to γ0 =0 .7 . The remaining coeﬃcients in this equation, γ2, γ3,a n dγ4 capture
the short run impact of output and interest rates on the capital buﬀer.
The level of output has two diﬀerent impacts on the bank capital buﬀer.
Periods of rapid output growth are associated with increased loan demand and
hence with a decline in the bank capital buﬀer as the growth of loan assets
outstrips bank net worth. At the same time higher output growth reduces
loan losses and hence increases bank earnings and the ratio of bank capital to
bank assets. Empirical models of bank capital buﬀer dynamics suggest that
in most periods this ﬁrst eﬀect dominates so that bank capital ratios move
counter-cyclically. We therefore assume that the impact of output on capital
buﬀe r si sn e g a t i v ew i t hγ4 = −0.2 . This is in line with estimated empirical
15Woodford (2003, ch. 5) shows that the corresponding elasticity is equal to (1 − βη)σ,
where η i st h ed e g r e eo fh a b i tp e r s i s t e n c ea n dσ is the intertemporal elasticity of
consumption, in the microfounded New Keynesian model with habit persistence. Assuming
σ =2and η =0 .75 and β =0 .99 yields α1 + α2 =( 1− .99 ∗ 0.75) ∗ 2=0 .515
16Most cost channel models calibrate the contribution of the cost channel by assuming this
is the same as that of marginal costs on inﬂation. Exceptions are Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
who use GMM estimation and report (Table 1 page 207) coeﬃcients on the cost channel
(relative to those on marginal costs) varying from 1.239 to 11.831. Much lower estimates
are reported by Rabanal (2003) using Bayesian estimation, with values of 0.24 for the US
and 0.17 for the Euro area.
17Further evidence of an important cost channel impact is found in Gaiotti and Secchi
(2004) who report that, for ﬁrms that reset prices rapidly within a large panel of Italian
ﬁrms, product prices are increased within one year by enough to fully compensate for any
changes in the cost of bank ﬁnance of working capital.
15models of bank capital buﬀer dynamics.18As for the calibration of the relevant
shocks, we refer to Woodford (2003, p. 345). He notes that the standard error
of (annualised) residuals of the estimated IS curve in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) model is 3.72 per cent. We translate this into our quarterly setup, such
that the standard error of demand shock ση is set equal to 0.93%. We set the
standard error of the cost-push shock equal to 1%.
The evolution of the capital buﬀer also depends upon the level of market
and bank interest rates in the previous quarter, through their impact on bank
net interest income. In most countries (the US is an exception) bank interest
income tends to increase as market rates of interest rise. This is because of the
presence of unremunerated liabilities, both transactions deposits and equity
capital, typically around 20% of the balance sheet. Our baseline reﬂects this
situation, assuming on the asset side of the balance sheet that 15% of total
assets are ﬁxed interest rate loans and bonds, 75% are adjustable rate loans,
10% are short term marketable assets carrying the market rate of interest, and
5% are unremunerated. On the liability side we assume that 20% of liabilities
are unremunerated, 65% are remunerated at an adjustable rate that moves
with bank lending rates, and the remaining 15% of liabilities are funded at
market rates of interest. These parameterisations then implies that the annual
bank net interest income expressed as a proportion of total assets (ht), can be
expressed follows
h =0 .75rt−1 +0.10it−1 −0.65rt−1 −0.15it−1 =+ 0 .10rt−1 −0.05it−1 (3.6)
The corresponding expression for the impact of interest rates on bank net
income included as part of our state equation for bt is γ2it−1 +γ3 (rt−1 − it−1).
Here the parameters are quarterly, not annual, and we distinguish an interest
rate level eﬀect γ2 from an interest margin eﬀect γ3. Assuming that the rate
of tax on bank net interest income is 30% so post-tax income is 0.7× pre-tax
i n c o m e ,w et h e nh a v et h ep a r a m e t e r i s a t i o nγ2 =( 0 .10 − 0.05) × 0.7/4=
+0.00875 and γ3 =+ 0 .10 × 0.7/4=+ 0 .0175.19
In order to simulate the impact of the introduction of the new Basel II
accord we alter the coeﬃcient value of output on the capital buﬀer. Under
t h en e wa c c o r d( w h i c hw i l la p p l yt oa l lb a n k si nE u r o p eb u to n l yt h el a r g e s t
banks in the US) bank capital requirements will be reduced when output is
above trend and credit quality improves, while they will be increased when
output is below trend and credit quality deteriorates. We assume a level of
cyclicality that is slightly greater than reported in the various quantitative
impact studies conducted by the Basel committee. Speciﬁcally, we impose the
assumption that regulatory bank capital requirements are reduced by 0.4% of
total assets when output gap rises by 1%. Since a increase in the regulatory
18Jokipii and Milne (2006), using annual data for European banks, ﬁnd lagged coeﬃents
in the range 0.2 to 0.4, consistent with a coeﬃcient on the quarterly lagged variable of
bettween 0.6 and 0.9. They report estimated coeﬃents on current output of -0.1. These
estimates are comparable to those found in other studies.
19We also investigated an alternative ‘US’ parameterisation, with a much higher
proportion of ﬁxed interest rate lending, so as to allow for the diﬀerent institutional
arrangements in the US where ﬁxed interest rate lending is relative important. This is
alternative is discussed alongside our other simulation results below.
16bank capital requirement results in a one for one reduction in the capital buﬀer
this implies that the coeﬃcient γ4 alters from −0.2 to γ4 = −0.2+0.4=+ 0 .2.
Ad i ﬃcult parameter to determine is μ measuring the direct impact of
a change in the capital buﬀer on loan interest rates. To obtain some idea
of the scaling involved, we note that bank equity capital, as a proportion
of total bank assets, is typically 3—4% greater than minimum regulatory
requirements. Therefore a decline in b from steady state value of 0 to -4%
corresponds to a reduction in the equity capital of the entire banking sector
to below its regulatory minimum, a severe systemic banking crisis resulting in
both increased loan interest margins and probably also considerable non-price
rationing of lending. In our model however this loan rationing must be
captured entirely through an increase in the loan interest rate. We assume
μ =1 .5, implying that the reduction of capital to minimum regulatory levels
increases eﬀective loan margins by 6 percentage points.20
In discussing the monetary policy impact of Basel II, we will also consider
how far the cyclical impact can be oﬀset by the likely increase the steady state
value of the regulatory capital buﬀer (a consequence that is likely to follow from
the operation of the Pillar 2 requirements of the new accord for supervisors to
review the capital planning of banks and ensure that they have enough capital
to cope with the cyclical variability of minimum requirements introduced by
the new accord).21 We deal with this possibility in a fairly simple manner,
assuming that when the target capital buﬀer is doubled (this does not itself
aﬀect the simulations since we measure bt relative to the target) the impact of
deviations of the capital buﬀer from target on the lending rate rt is halved so
that now μ =0 .75.
4 Equilibrium responses and optimal policy
Our principal ﬁndings reported in Subsection 4.1 concern the diﬀerent
responses of output and inﬂation to a demand and cost-push shocks, when
there is a bank lending channel, comparing cases when it operates through
a conventional demand side interaction and when it also operates through
the cost channel via marginal costs of production (most of these ﬁndings are
illustrated in Figures 4.1—4.3). We then go on in Subsection 4.2 to examine
the impact of making bank capital regulation more cyclical (illustrated in
Figures 4.4—4.5) and the consequences of an exogenous shock to bank capital.
These subsections report only the results obtained under the assumption that
20This supply impact can be compared to that reported by Milne et al (2006) Table 4,
where a 4% decline of the capital buﬀer induces a decline in bank lending of 20 percent over
one year.
21The various quantitative impact studies conducted by the Basel committee reveal
that the new accord will reduce aggregate minimum capital requirements, with the main
reductions being given banks with large mortgage portfolios. The individual capital
assessments on the other hand will raise target capital buﬀers, so the overall imapct on
actual bank capital remains uncertain.
17monetary policy is optimised under discretion.22 Finally in Subsection 4.3
we compare intertemporal losses arising in these diﬀerent cases, under both
discretion and commitment.
4.1 The dependence of the bank lending channel on the cost
channel
Figure 4.1 reports the impact of a demand shock under ﬁve diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the impact of interest rates on output and inﬂation. The ﬁrst
point to be taken from this ﬁgure is that in the absence of a cost channel
monetary policy can fully oﬀset the bank lending channel. Compare the
outcome under the ﬁrst of these speciﬁcations, the standard model with neither
a bank lending nor a cost channel (assuming α2 =0 .5,a n dα3 = β2 = β3 =0 ),
with the outcome under the second speciﬁcation, where there is now a bank
lending channel but still no cost channel (assuming α2 =0 .3, α3 =0 .2,a n d
β2 = β3 =0 .). These are the superimposed horizontal lines in the panels
for output and inﬂation in Figure 4.1 ie in both of these cases monetary
policy makers can fully oﬀset demand shocks and output and inﬂation remain
constant.




























standard model, no cost channel or loan rate impact (S)
standard model plus loan rate impact on demand (C−Li)
cost channel but no loan rate impacts (model C)
cost channel plus loan rate impact via demand (B1)
loan rate impact on demand plus cost channel working through loan rate (B2)
Figure 4.1 Loan rate channel under demand shock
22We obtained essentially the same results when monetary policy operates with
commitment.
18A similar result obtains in the case of a cost-push shock (although this is
not illustrated in our ﬁgures). Policy makers can never fully oﬀset a cost-push
shock, they now face a trade-oﬀ and must accept some increase in inﬂation and
loss of output. However output and inﬂation still follow identical paths under
these two speciﬁcations (the standard model and standard model plus bank
lending channel operating through aggregate demand). Policy makers are able
to fully oﬀset the bank lending channel and achieve the same outcomes for
output and inﬂation under both speciﬁcations.
This is our ﬁrst main ﬁnding. If there is no cost channel of monetary
policy transmission the monetary authorities can always fully oﬀset the impact
of bank capital and bank loan margins on aggregate demand by choosing
an appropriate level for market interest rates. For example as bank capital
buﬀers increase and loan margins fall the impact of lower bank lending rates
on aggregate demand can be fully oﬀset by an appropriate additional tightening
of monetary policy through higher market rates of interest (see Figure 4.1). As
a result the bank lending channel has no eﬀect on output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs,
under either demand or supply shocks.23
This is essentially the same result at that reported by Cecchetti and Li
(2005), who show in a similar macro-monetary setting to our own that cyclical
changes in bank capital regulations can be fully oﬀset by altering the stance of
monetary policy. We ﬁnd that this is a more general result, policy makers can
oﬀset all output and inﬂation impacts of the bank lending channel not just of
bank capital regulation.
What about when there is cost channel, ie when interest rates increase
the marginal costs of production and as a result alter current inﬂation rates
(β2 + β3 > 0)? As a result policy makers are no longer able to fully oﬀset
demands shock. As shown by the third line in Figure 4.1 (a cost channel
simulation (α2 =0 .5, β2 =0 .0333) with no bank lending channel (α3 = β3 =0 )
ie our model C) a positive shock to output of 1% is then met with a fairly large
increase of interest rates, of around 2.25%. The outcome is that inﬂation rises
fairly moderately, by 0.1% while output falls by about 0.225%. Thereafter
output and inﬂation gradually converge back to their steady state levels.24
If we now introduce a bank lending channel into this setting, where there
is a cost as well as a demand channel of monetary policy transmission, then
the result is a change in output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs; however the sign of this
impact is ambiguous, a bank lending channel may either improve or worsen
output-inﬂation tradeoﬀs depending on the relative importance of bank loan
23This is not to say that policy makers can entirely ignore the bank lending channel. It
will still be important from an operational perspective that they understand its current and
likely future impact on aggregate demand; and there are likely to be distributional impacts
from the bank lending channel that need to be taken into account when presenting monetary
policy decisions.
24We do not report results in detail, but we also found that the cost channel worsens
output inﬂation tradeoﬀs relative to the standard model, following a supply shock as well
as following a demand shock. With our parameterisation and a shock the same as that
assumed for Figure 2, ﬁrst period output falls 3.3% with the cost channel and 3.0% without
the cost channel, while inﬂation rises 1.4% with the cost channel and 1.2% without. Output
and inﬂation impacts in subsquent periods are also greater with a cost channel.
19rates in determining output and inﬂation. In any case this further impact of
the bank lending channel on output and inﬂation is rather smaller than that
created by the introduction of the cost channel.
These ﬁndings are illustrated in the two remaining cases presented in Figure
4.1. These make a common assumption about the impact of the bank lending
channel on aggregate demand (α2 =0 .3, α3 =0 .2), while imposing two
diﬀerent assumptions about the impact of bank lending channel on marginal
costs. The ﬁr s tc a s ei sw h e r et h e r ei sn oi m p a c to fb a n kl o a nr a t e so nm a r g i n a l
costs (β2 =0 .0333, β3 =0 ) ie our baseline model B1. In this case the bank
lending channel worsens monetary policy trade-oﬀs, since output declines lead
to increased capital buﬀers and lower bank loan margins from period 2 onwards.
As a result policy makers then need to impose a larger rise of market rates
of interest to achieve any given reduction in aggregate demand, but in so
doing ﬁrms face increased marginal costs that feeds into higher inﬂation. The
outcome is that monetary policy makers accept a somewhat lower output and
higher inﬂation from period 2 of the shock onwards.
The ﬁnal case illustrated in Figure 4.1 is the opposite one where only bank
loan rates and not market rates, aﬀect marginal costs (β2 =0 , β3 =0 .0333)i e
our baseline model B2. We think this situation is slightly more plausible than
B1 with no bank loan rate impact on marginal costs, because working capital is
ﬁnanced predominantly from bank lending not market borrowing and therefore
the bank lending channel should have a relatively larger impact on marginal
costs than on aggregate demand.25 Figure 4.1 shows that following a demand
shock the bank lending channel now improves monetary policy trade-oﬀs. The
reason is again straightforward: the output decline leads to increased capital
buﬀers and lower bank loan margins from period 2 onwards, and these in turn
lower marginal costs and reduce inﬂation and allow the policy maker to respond
somewhat more aggresively to the demand shock. As a result the policy maker
can achieve slightly lower inﬂation and higher output from period 2 onwards
under model B2, compared to the situation in model C when there is only a
cost channel.
The bank lending channel has a similar impact on output-inﬂation
trade-oﬀs following a supply shock (Figure 4.2) as following a demand shock
(Figure 4.1). A diﬀerence between these two ﬁg u r e si st h a tf o l l o w i n ga
supply shock the output impact is a good deal larger than those resulting
from a demand shocks (output declines by over 3% following a standardised
supply shock (Figure 4.2) compared with 0.2% for a standardised demand
shock (Figure 4.1)). Once again the impact of the bank lending channel on
output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs depends on the relative importance of the bank loan
rates for aggregate demand and for marginal costs.
When bank loan rates aﬀect only aggregate demand and not marginal
costs (ie model B1 rather than B2) then, compared to the pure cost channel
(model C in which there is no impact from bank loan rates), the policy makers
must accept a somewhat larger fall of output and rise of inﬂation from period 2
25The assumption that bank lending ﬁnances working caital is also made by Christiano
et al (2006) and in fact, in many other models that feature ﬁnancial intermediation and
working capital.
20onwards; so once again the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ has worsened.26 When
bank loan rates and not market rates aﬀect marginal costs (model B2) then
the policy makers can achieve a somewhat smaller fall of output and rise of
inﬂation from period 2 onwards. In both cases these eﬀects arise because the
decline of output leads to an increase in the bank capital buﬀer and hence a
reduction in bank loan rates relative to market rates at the time when policy
makers are raising interest rates in order to reduce inﬂation.
































cost channel but no loan rate impacts (C)
cost channel plus loan rate impact on demand (B1)
loan rate impact on demand plus cost channel working through loan rate (B2)
Figure 4.2 Loan rate channel under cost-push shock
The intuition from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 carries forward to other comparable
simulations. For example we have considered an alternative simulation with
α2 =0 .3, α3 =0 ,2,a n dβ2 = β3 =0 .0167,a n dβ3 =0 .0333 (a balanced
version of our baseline models). Now the aggregate demand and marginal cost
channel impacts are roughly oﬀsetting and the outcome is very close to that
obtained under the pure cost channel (model C).
We also explored the impact of the bank-lending channel with diﬀerent
weightings on the output and inﬂation policy objectives. These results are
reported in the eﬃciency frontiers27 depicted in Figure 4.3. In this ﬁgure we
26As we have already pointed out, this eﬀect depends on the presence of a cost channel.
When there is no cost channel at all β2 = β3 =0then any impact of bank loan rates on
aggregate demand (α3 > 0) can be fully oﬀfset by the monetary authorities.
27We are indebted to Ulf Söderström for his suggestion to use eﬃciency frontiers in the
analysis.
21let the central bank’s weight on output change from 0 (strict inﬂation targeting)
to 0.1 (moderate weight on output variability) representing small perturbation
from our baseline weight of 0.05. This shows that our qualitative conclusions do
not depend upon the weighting given to the output objective. Output-inﬂation
trade-oﬀsa r eu n a ﬀected by introducing the bank lending channel into the
standard model without a cost channel. If there is a cost channel (model C)
then the introduction of a bank lending channel always either worsens (model
B1) or improves (model B2) the monetary policy trade-oﬀ.
Figure 4.3 also reveals that the impact of the bank lending channel on
output inﬂation tradeoﬀs( t h es h i f t si nt h et r a d e o ﬀs from model C to model
B1 or model B2) measured by their distance from the origin are smaller than
the impact of the cost channel on output-inﬂation tradeoﬀs (the shift in the
tradeoﬀ f r o mm o d e lSt om o d e lC ) .
We draw two further conclusions from this Figure. First we note that with
the introduction of the cost-channel, the monetary policy maker can no-longer
fully oﬀset the impact of cost and demand shocks on inﬂation. Even when there
is zero-weight on output, ie the extreme right-hand points on the eﬃciency
frontiers, the variance of inﬂa t i o ni sg r e a t e rt h a nz e r o .T h i si sw h yw i t hal o w
weighting on output the trade-oﬀs in the presence of the cost channel (the cost
channel alone C and the cost channel combined with the two bank lending
channel speciﬁcations B1 and B2) lie well above the trade-oﬀ when there is
no cost channel. We also observe, unsurprisingly, that the impact of the bank
lending channel on intertemporal losses is very small when the policy maker
places a low weight on output variability. In this case the policy maker can
achieve a very similar outcome for inﬂation, with or without a bank lending
channel. But if the policy maker places a relatively high weighting on output
variability, then the impact of the bank lending channel on inﬂation variability
and hence on intertemporal losses is much greater.
































Loan rate impact on demand (C−Li)
cost channel but no loan rate impacts (C)
cost channel plus loan rate impact on demand (B1)
loan rate impact on demand plus cost channel working through loan rate (B2)
Figure 4.3 Eﬃciency frontiers under diﬀerent model speciﬁcations
4.2 The impact of Basel II and of shocks to bank capital
Our next two ﬁgures (Figures 4.4 and Figure 4.5) analyse the impact of cyclical
variability in bank capital regulation, arising from the introduction of the new
Basel II accord, both under a demand and a supply shock. Throughout these
ﬁgures we use the baseline B2 from Figures 4.1—4.2 assuming α2 =0 .3,α3 =0 .2,
and β2 =0 ,a n dβ3 =0 .0333.W e c o n s i d e r ﬁrst the introduction of Basel II
compared with the existing Basel I. With the introduction of cyclically varying
capital requirements under Basel II capital buﬀers now move pro-cyclically in
the face of both supply and demand shocks, declining from period 2 onwards
because of the reduction in output. As a result loan interest rates increase
relative to market rates and the resulting impact on marginal costs leads to
a deterioration in output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs. Output is lower and inﬂation is
higher from period 2 onwards.






























Basel II & higher target buffer (A2)
Figure 4.4 Cyclically-varying Basel II capital requirements: demand
shock
The impact is quantitatively much larger in the case of a supply shock,
where period 2 output is nearly 1% lower under Basel II than under Basel I
and inﬂation is almost 0.5% higher, compared with a period 2 loss of output
of about 0.04% and higher inﬂation of 0.02% following a demand shock, but in
both cases the period 2 loss of output and increase of inﬂation are about two
ﬁfths greater under Basel II regulation than under Basel I. We ﬁnd that the
impacts, while going in the same direction as those reported in Figures 4.4 and
4.5, are very much smaller under our balanced baseline B1, the period 2 loss
of output and rise of inﬂation being only around one-twentieth larger under
Basel II as under Basel I.
Policy makers have suggested that any undesirable macroeconomic impact
of the new Basel accord can be oﬀset by using Pillar II supervisory review, and
in particular the review of internal capital assessments (ICAP), encouraging
banks to hold larger target levels of capital and managing their capital through
the business cycle so they do not breach regulatory minimum requirements.
The ﬁnal simulations in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 capture this mechanism by reducing
the impact of capital buﬀer shortfalls on bank loan margins (reducing μ from
1.5 to 0.75). This is appropriate since with larger capital buﬀers the sensitivity
of loan rates to ﬂuctuations in the capital buﬀer will be reduced. We ﬁnd that
24under our baseline model B2 this reduction partially but not entirely oﬀsets
the deterioration in output inﬂation trade-oﬀs.

































Basel II & higher target buffer (A2)
Figure 4.5 Cyclically varying Basel II capital requirements: cost
push shock
T h ei n t u i t i o nb e h i n dt h e s er e s u l t si so n c ea g a i ns t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . A s
we have already shown with the baseline model B2 and Basel I capital
rules, ﬂuctuations in bank capital serve to oﬀset the impact of the cost
channel, reducing bank loan rates and hence reducing the impact of the cost
channel during periods when market interest rates are increased and hence
improving output inﬂation trade-oﬀs. In contrast, under Basel II, bank capital
ﬂuctuations increase bank loan rates when market rates are increased and
hence exacerbating the impact of the cost channel. Introducing larger capital
buﬀers and lower sensitivity of interest rates to the capital buﬀer weakens this
cost channel impact of bank loan rates, but cannot fully restore the beneﬁcial
impact of the bank lending channel obtained under the Basel I regulations.
We have also explored the consequences of an exogenous decline in the bank
capital buﬀe r ,s u c ha so c c u r r e di nf o re x a m p l ei nt h ee a r l y1 9 9 0 si nJ a p a na n d
Scandinavia and more recently amongst banks exposed to sub-prime mortgage
backed securities. We ﬁnd that policy makers respond to such a decline in
b a n kc a p i t a lw i t har e d u c t i o ni nt h em a r k e tr a t eo fi n t e r e s ti et h e r ei sa n
accomodative loosening of monetary policy. This is because the reduction
25of bank capital buﬀers results in an increase of bank loan rates and this
change of interest rates faced by households and ﬁrms reduces output below
its equilibrium level.
In the setting where there is no cost channel monetary policy makers are
able to fully oﬀset this shock to bank capital. The outcome is more complicated
in the case of our baseline B2 when bank loan rates contribute to the cost
channel. Now a decline in bank capital also operates through marginal costs,
at the same time both increasing the rate of inﬂation and reducing the level of
output. In this situation policy makers are still accommodative, but they are
unable to avoid some decline in output and increase of inﬂation. We also ﬁnd
that the impact of a shock to the capital buﬀer is similar under both Basel I
and Basel II. If banks hold higher levels of capital buﬀers to oﬀset the Basel II
pro-cyclicality of capital requirements, then the magnitude of the impacts on
both output and on inﬂation are reduced.
4.3 Further analysis of intertemporal losses
In this sub-section, in order to highlight the diﬀering costs caused by
regulatory changes under diﬀerent assumptions of cost channel, we evaluate
the intertemporal loss function given in (3.1).28 As before we assume ﬁrst that
policy is conducted under discretion. The ﬁrst column of table 4.1 shows the
intertemporal loss under diﬀerent assumptions of cost channel and regulatory
framework. The following 3 columns measure the cyclical variation of the
economy by means of unconditional standard errors. Our ﬁrst observation is
that introduction of cost channel increases the volatility of inﬂation, output
and capital buﬀer: this is simply due to the fact that the policymaker needs to
trade-oﬀ some output variability for inﬂation variability when there is a cost
channel operating through market interest rates.
Second, we observe that when market interest rates work through
intertemporal trade-oﬀs and bank loan rates work mainly through marginal
costs, the behaviour of loan margins mitigate the eﬀects of cost channel
(compare models C and B2). This is due to the counter-cyclical movements in
bank capital buﬀers which leads to lower bank loan rate margins when output
and interest rates are below the steady state.
Finally we amend model B2 to take account of the new capital regulations
being introduced through the Basel II accord, and the resulting pro-cyclical
movement in capital buﬀers. Now changes in loan margins exaggerate rather
than mitigate the impact of the cost channel and the policy maker is forced
to accept more output and inﬂation variability. This results in a substantial
increase in costs in comparison to Basel I. Allowing for a larger capital buﬀer
and hence a smaller impact of changes in the capital buﬀer on loan margins
slightly improves the situation, restoring about half the loss introduced under
Basel II.
28We also repeated these calculations introducing small shocks to the capital buﬀer itself.
This merely increases the volatility of output. Given that output has a small weight on
intertemporal loss criteria, our basic results in terms ordering of diﬀerent regimes remains
intact.
26Table 4.2 Intertemporal loss and state variable volatility under
discretion
Table 4.2 shows the equivalent results when the policy is conducted under
commitment. In the standard model with no cost or loan channels commitment
allows policy makers to achieve a much lower variability of inﬂation, compared
to the results obtained under discretion. The impact on loss, relative to the
standard model, of introducing the cost channel and the lending channel are
very similar under commitment and under discretion. Loss increases with the
introduction of the cost channel but then improves under our baseline model
B2 (because the bank lending channel then oﬀsets the cost channel), and once
again increases when Basel II is imposed on this baseline (but to a smaller
degree than when the policy maker operates with discretion.)
Table 4.2 Intertemporal loss and state variable volatility under
commitment
275 Discussion and conclusions
There is a large literature on the bank lending channel suggesting that bank
balance sheets and lending rates can have a major impact on the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. But this literature for the most part takes
a partial equilibrium perspective and fails to address the extent to which
monetary policy makers can respond to oﬀset the impact of the bank lending
channel on output and inﬂation. The objective of this paper has been to
address this issue, examining the impact of the bank lending channel on output
inﬂation trade-oﬀs in a New Keynesian macroeconomic model of optimal
monetary policy.
Our main conclusion is that, with reasonable parameter assumptions,
the bank lending channel has only a fairly small impact on output-inﬂation
trade-oﬀs. Extending an insight of Cecchetti and Li (2005), we ﬁnd that
the response of output and inﬂation to both demand and supply shocks are
completely unaﬀected by the bank lending channel, as long as interest rates
operate entirely through the conventional route via intertemporal trade-oﬀs
and aggregate demand. In this situation policy makers can always oﬀset
the impact of the lending channel on output and inﬂa t i o nb ya na p p r o p r i a t e
adjustment of interest rates, both in response to supply or demand shocks.
We ﬁnd that the bank lending channel can alter output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs
if there is also a cost channel ie if interest rates alter marginal costs and thus
directly impact on inﬂation, as well as aﬀecting the economy through aggregate
demand. The presence of a cost channel means that demands shocks can no
longer be fully oﬀset by policy makers and supply shocks are rather greater
than they would otherwise be. Following either a demand or a supply shock,
policy makers increase interest rates and output falls. But if interest rates
aﬀect marginal costs as well as aggregate demand, then it is also possible for
the margin between bank loan rates and market rates of interest, as well as
the level of interest rates, to aﬀect output and inﬂation.
The sign and magnitude of the resulting bank loan channel impact on
output and inﬂation depends upon the relative contribution of bank loan rates,
in comparison to market rates, on aggregate demand and on marginal costs.
If bank loan rates have a relatively large impact on aggregate demand and
relatively small impact on marginal costs, then larger increases in interest
rates are required to achieve a given reduction of aggregate demand and
output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs deteriorate ie the bank lending channel ampliﬁes
the cost-channel. In the reverse and we believe more plausible situation,
where bank loan rates have a relatively large impact on marginal costs and
relatively small impact on aggregate demand, then output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs
improve ie the bank lending channel oﬀsets the cost-channel. In either
case the quantitative magnitude of these bank lending channel impacts on
output-inﬂation tradeoﬀs are clearly less than the impact of the cost-channel,
our simulations suggesting their impact on achievable output and inﬂation is
about one half those of the cost-channel.
We further show that if the bank lending channel does indeed lead to an
improvement on output inﬂation trade-oﬀs through its amelioration of the cost
channel then t h es a m eb a n kl o a nr a t ec o s t - c h a n n e li n t e r a c t i o nm e a n st h a tt h e
28introduction of pro-cyclical capital requirements such as those of Pillar 1 of the
new Basel II accord results in a worsening of output-inﬂation tradeoﬀs, even
when monetary policy response responds optimally, and that this worsening is
quantitatively much larger than the improvement in output-inﬂation tradeoﬀs
resulting from the operation of the bank lending channel under the old Basel
I accord. We reach this conclusion, directly opposite to that of Cecchetti and
Li (2005), because in our setting bank loan rates play a particularly important
role in the cost-channel and as a result the impact of pro-cyclical bank capital
requirements on bank loan rates cannot be fully corrected through adjustment
of market rates. We also ﬁnd that the better management of bank capital
buﬀers through the business cycle, promoted by Pillar 2 of the new Basel
accord, oﬀsets much but not all of this Pillar I deterioration in output inﬂation
tradeoﬀs.
While our model elucidates the impact of the lending channel and of bank
capital requirements on output-inﬂation trade-oﬀs, there are several reasons
for believing that this impact is likely to be rather smaller than reported in our
simulations, at least within the normal range of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
First our results are predicated on a quantiﬁcation of the cost channel that
is towards the upper end of the range of estimates found in the literature.
While there is no consensus on the magnitude of the cost channel it is quite
p o s s i b l et h a ti ti ss m a l l e rt h a nw eh a v ea s s u m e da n dh e n c et h a to u rs i m u l a t i o n s
overstate the impact of the bank lending channel on output inﬂation trade-oﬀs.
Second there is no strong reason for believing that bank loan rates have
such a relatively large imapact on marginal costs and relatively small impact
on intertemporal tradeoﬀs, compared to market rates as we assume in our
baseline B2. If the relative impact of bank loan rates and market rates on
aggregate demand and on marginal costs are similar then the bank lending
channel makes little diﬀerence to macroeconomic outcomes. Third, it maybe
that our parameterisations exaggerate somewhat the degree of counter-cyclical
ﬂuctuations in bank capital ratios, especially in banking systems such as the
US where banks conduct a relatively large amount of ﬁxed interest rate lending.
Introducing this relationship into our model, the rise of interest rates following
a macroeconomic shock would reduce bank interest income and hence lead to
less pronounced cyclical ﬂuctuations in bank capital buﬀe r st h a nw er e p o r t
here.
Finally we show that, under what we believe to be the most plausible
assumption that bank loan rates have a relatively large impact marginal costs,
an exogenous shock to bank capital has a macro-economic impact rather
similar to a cost (ie inﬂation) shock; it leads to a loss of output and rise of
inﬂation which cannot be fully oﬀset through adjustment of monetary policy
ie our model replicates at least some of the output losses which have been
found to follow declines in bank capital. There are however good reasons for
believing that the output losses following a major depletion of banking sector
capital will be larger than predicted by these model simulations. The linear
quadratic framework of this paper, designed as it is for analysing relatively
small deviations in output and inﬂation about their long-run values which must
be controlled by monetary policy actions, is not ideal for addressing concerns
about ﬁnancial stability. In a systemic crisis, when bank balance sheets are
29severely depleted, the output and inﬂation impacts of bank net worth may be
very much larger than those obtained in the linear-quadratic framework.
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34Appendix
State space representation of the model
Our model consists of following 4 equations, as discussed in the main text
yt = α0yt−1 + α1yt+1|t − α2(it − πt+1|t) − α3(rt − πt+1|t)+ηt (A1.1)
πt = β0πt−1 + β1πt+1|t + β2it + β3rt + β4yt +  t (A1.2)
bt = γ0bt−1 + γ2it−1 + γ3(rt−1 − it−1)+γ4yt−1 (A1.3)
rt = it − μbt (A1.4)
Moving the equation for the capital buﬀer (A1.3) one period forward and
re-ordering the variables so that the predetermined variables are written ﬁrst.
This yields
ηt+1 = ρηηt + vη,t+1
 t+1 = ρη t + v ,t+1 (A1.5)
rt = it − μbt (A1.6)
bt+1 =( γ0 − γ3μ)bt + γ4yt (A1.7)
−α3rt + α1yt+1|t +( α2 + α3)πt+1|t = yt − α0yt−1 + α2it − ηt
β3rt + β1πt+1|t = πt − β0πt−1 − β2it − β4yt −  t
Denoting the predetermined state variables (including the laws of motion for
the stochastic disturbances) by a vector zt+1 =
©
ηt+1,  t+1,r t,b t+1,y t,πt
ª
,t h e





















Following (A1.7) the elements of matrices E,A,B and Cu are deﬁned as follows
E = E =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
10 0 000 0 0
01 0 000 0 0
00 1 000 0 0
00 0 100 0 0
00 0 010 0 0
00 0 001 0 0
00−α3 000α1 (α2 + α3)
00 β3 000 0 β1
⎞




⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
ρη 00 0 0 0 0 0
0 ρε 00 0 0 0 0
00 0 −μ 000 0
00 0 ( γ0 − γ3μ)0 0 γ4 0
00 0 0 0 0 10
00 0 0 0 0 01
−100 0 −α0 01 0
0 −10 0 0 −β0 −β4 1
⎞






and ﬁnally Cu matrix is
Cu =
⎛









⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠

















where ˜ A = E−1A, ˜ B = E−1B, and ˜ C = E−1C. Given (A1.8), we can then
express periodic quadratic loss function in terms of the state variables zt and






















Standard solution algorithms can then be used to minimise discounted sum of
Lt and at the same time solving for rational expectations equilibrium (See for
instance Söderlind, 1999, and Svensson and Woodford, 2003). We have used
an amended version of software originally written by Gerali and Lippi, 2003.
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